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Abstract 
In two experimental studies (conducted in Britain and Italy), participants read about a politician 
answering to leadership- versus morality-related allegations using either downward counterfactuals 
(“things could have been worse, if…”) or upward counterfactuals (“things could have been better, 
if…”). Downward messages increased the perception of the politician’s leadership, while both 
downward and upward messages increased morality perception. Political sophistication moderated 
the effect of message direction, with downward messages increasing perceived morality in low 
sophisticates and upward messages increasing perceived morality in high sophisticates. In the latter 
group, the acknowledgement of a responsibility-taking intent mediated morality judgment. Results 
were consistent across different countries, highlighting previously unexplored effects of 
communication on the perception of the “Big Two” dimensions. 
Keywords: social perception; counterfactual communication; political sophistication. 
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THE “BIG TWO” IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: THE EFFECTS OF ATTACKING AND 
DEFENDING POLITICIANS’ LEADERSHIP OR MORALITY 
Introduction 
Politicians often have to account for negative results deriving from their past decisions and 
they do this in different ways (see McGraw, 2001). For example, they may use hypothetical 
downward comparisons, by saying that “things would have gone even worse if a different course of 
action had been taken.” This response might show a politician’s determination and consistency, but 
it could be interpreted as defensive, too. On the other hand, they may use upward counterfactual 
comparisons, by saying that “things could have gone better if a different course of action had been 
taken.” This admission might be welcomed as a sign of frankness, but it would also very likely 
expose the politician’s previous poor judgment to criticism. In the present paper, we investigated 
how political communication influences citizens' perception of politicians on the two fundamental 
dimensions of personality, namely, agency and communion (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). In 
particular, we examined communicative situations in which a politician’s leadership or morality 
was questioned, analyzing how different defensive strategies used by the politician (based on 
hypothetical downward or upward comparisons) influenced citizens’ perception of the two 
personality dimensions. 
Impression formation in the political context 
There is growing consensus in research on social perception that two fundamental 
dimensions, usually referred to as competence and warmth or agency and communion, underlie 
judgments of the self (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner, & Wojciszke, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; 
Wojciszke, 2005), others (Wojciszke & Abele, 2008), and groups (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 
2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). Several recent studies in political 
psychology found a similar convergence on two main dimensions in the perception of political 
leaders, which can be traced back to agency and communion (Barisione & Catellani, 2008; Caprara 
& Zimbardo, 2004; Cislak & Wojciszke, 2006, 2008; Vecchione, Gonzalez Castro, & Caprara, 
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2011). This pattern of results holds in different national and political contexts and in studies 
conducted from different theoretical perspectives. For example, research by Caprara and colleagues, 
which assumed the “Big Five” model of personality as a theoretical reference, found that traits 
attributed to politicians cluster along two dimensions substantially conforming to the “Big Two” 
dimensions of agency and communion (Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 2002; Caprara, 
Vecchione, Barbaranelli, & Fraley, 2007; Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2008).  
Within each dimension, some traits seem to be more central than others. This is consistent 
with research on impression formation, which found that the importance attributed to some traits 
rather than others changes as a function of the target’s role and relation to the perceiver (Wojciszke 
& Abele, 2008). In the political context, the most relevant traits in the agency dimension are 
energetic, resolute and competent, while the most relevant ones in the communion dimension are 
sincere, loyal and honest (Caprara et al., 2008; Jones & Hudson, 1996; Mondak, 1995). Evidently, 
when people have to choose representatives they attribute a particular importance to their ability to 
take decisions effectively and manage complex situations (in other words to their leadership) and to 
their commitment to social norms accepted by the group (in other words to their morality).  
One might wonder which of these two dimension, leadership or morality, has a greater role 
in attracting citizens’ attention and orienting their evaluation of politicians. Several studies indicate 
that, compared to other personality dimensions, morality has greater importance in the perception 
and evaluation of other people (Abele & Brückmuller, 2011; Vonk 1999; Willis & Todorov, 2006; 
Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Ybarra et al., 2008). In particular, negative information about morality 
seems to have greater salience in person perception and information seeking (Brambilla, Rusconi, 
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011), possibly because such information is considered more threatening to 
the self (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). Something similar seems to occur in the political context. 
Cislak and Wojciszke (2008) found that morality weighted more than competence in the evaluation 
of politicians, but also that politicians were rated as lower in morality than in competence.  
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Other studies also indicate that citizens see morality as a weak spot in politicians’ 
personalities (Birch & Allen, 2010; Mazzoleni, 2007; Redlawsk & McCann, 2005). This negative 
perception of politicians’ morality is likely to vary according to the frequency of political scandals 
affecting the country the citizen is living in, and has been connected to low levels of trust in 
political institutions as a whole (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Consistent with the interpretation given by 
this research, political scientists link the primacy of the morality dimension in the evaluation of 
political leaders to the dismal consideration of politicians’ morality and the potential harm deriving 
from their acts of moral misconduct (Newman, 2003). 
While several studies have investigated politicians’ personality dimensions and traits 
analyzing citizens’ impression formation process, research on how political communication may 
influence such process is still limited (see McGraw, 2003). In our research, we examined how 
politicians can cope with situations in which either their leadership or their morality are under 
attack. Our main hypothesis was that different types of defenses would have different effects in 
repairing the attacked leadership or morality dimension.  
The influence of defensive statements on impression formation 
Politicians are frequently put under scrutiny by the media and public opinion, particularly 
when they have to deal with scandals and unexpected or negative results of past decisions. In such 
situations, politicians devote considerable efforts to justifying and explaining their actions, in order 
to maintain or reinforce positive evaluations among their constituencies. They can resort to different 
strategies, ranging from denying involvement to pleading guilty, through bringing up different 
kinds of excuses and justifications (McGraw, 1990; McGraw, Timpone, & Bruck, 1993). The 
effects of post-scandal explanations on dimension-specific perceptions of politicians, however, have 
not been systematically investigated (Funk, 1996). 
One defensive strategy often employed by politicians is counterfactual downward 
comparison (McGraw, 1990; 1991; Catellani, 2011). When reacting to criticism of their past 
performances, they can say that if they had acted differently, things would have gone worse than 
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they actually did (e.g., “If we had not raised taxes, the State would have gone bankrupt”). Such 
comparisons with hypothetical worse conditions may prove beneficial for politicians using them. 
Past research showed that when counterfactuals of this type are generated spontaneously by people 
reflecting on their own past experiences, they generally result in positive self-evaluations 
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Sanna, 
Turley-Ames, & Meier, 1999). Besides, downward counterfactuals may induce observers to 
attribute less responsibility to the actors of an event resulting in a negative outcome. For example, 
in the judicial context Nario-Redmond and Branscombe (1996) found that generating downward 
counterfactuals about a rape scenario (e.g., thinking how the victim could have suffered even more 
serious harm from the aggression) led mock jurors to attribute less responsibility to the assailant. 
One might wonder whether the consequences are equally positive when people evaluate 
downward counterfactuals generated by others rather than by themselves. Research by Wong 
(2010) showed that airline pilots commenting on their actions in emergency situations with 
downward counterfactuals were actually judged more negatively than those using upward 
counterfactuals. Such effect of counterfactual direction on evaluation was mediated by participants’ 
perception that pilots using downward counterfactuals were not taking up enough responsibility for 
their past actions. Wong’s research suggests that people exposed to counterfactuals might be 
influenced not only by their content (i.e., what the speaker could have been done in the past), but 
also by the communicative intention attributed to the speaker (i.e., what the speaker wants the 
audience to believe, see Douglas & Sutton, 2006; Elder, Sutton, & Douglas, 2005; Hornsey & 
Imani, 2004). According to Wong’s (2010) findings, the inferred intention in those who generate 
upward counterfactuals may be the one of taking responsibility for a negative result in the past, 
therefore showing sincerity rather than defensiveness. 
In the present research we investigated the effects of downward and upward counterfactual 
defenses, expecting them to differentially influence the evaluation of politicians’ leadership and 
morality. We assumed that leadership pertains to performance, whereas morality pertains to social 
The “Big Two” in Political Communication      7 
 
relations (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). On this basis, we also assumed that the relational aspect of 
defensive communication (i.e., the communicative intention attributed to the speaker) would be 
particularly important in morality judgment.  
From these general assumptions, we developed specific predictions regarding the link 
between recourse to upward versus downward counterfactual defenses and the perceived leadership 
versus morality of the speaker. We expected leadership judgment to be mainly improved by 
downward counterfactual defenses, as downward comparison would cast past actions of the 
defending politician in a better light than comparison to upward counterfactuals. A possible 
objection to this expectation may arise from past research showing that spontaneous, self-focused 
upward counterfactuals can actually boost one’s intention to act more effectively in the future (see 
for a review Epstude & Roese, 2008). However, when these counterfactuals are employed in 
defensive communication they may be more likely to focus external observers’ attention on the fact 
that the speaker acted ineffectively in the past.  
As for morality evaluations, we expected them to be improved by both downward and 
upward counterfactuals. As we have described for leadership evaluations, downward 
counterfactuals can provide a comparison with a worse alternative to the actual situation, leading to 
a comparatively better evaluation of the politician’s morality. Such evaluation, however, might be 
improved by upward counterfactuals, as well. This would be the case when the receiver’s attention 
shifts from the actual content of the defense message (i.e., the idea that things could have been 
better) to the intention underlying such message (i.e., honestly accounting for one’s past decision 
and how they could have led to better results). We therefore expected both downward 
counterfactual and upward counterfactual defenses to improve morality evaluation, with the 
effectiveness of either defensive strategy depending on the receiver’s focus being either on the 
content of the defense or the intention underlying it. We expected the degree of political 
sophistication of receivers to play a role in this. 
The moderating effect of political sophistication 
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In our research, we expected that the effectiveness of communicative strategies based on 
upward or downward counterfactuals would vary depending on the level of political sophistication 
of those exposed to such communication. Political sophistication has been defined as the amount, 
complexity, and organization of political cognition (Luskin, 1990). It generally encompasses a 
number of more specific constructs as political interest, political knowledge (Delli Carpini, & 
Keeter, 1993), and expertise (Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990; Zaller, 1990).  
Past research indicates that political sophistication can alter the way people process and 
evaluate information about political events and politicians. Politically sophisticated citizens are 
more interested in getting information about candidates or political issues (Lodge & Taber, 2000). 
Also, they more deeply scrutinize messages coming from a source perceived as suspicious, making 
inferences about the source’s ulterior motives (McGraw, Lodge, & Jones, 2002). Consistently, in 
the present research we expected politically sophisticated participants to be more analytical in 
processing and evaluating politicians’ upward versus downward defenses, taking in consideration 
not only the content-related but also the intention-related components of defensive communication. 
In particular, we expected sophisticated participants to attribute higher morality to the politician in 
the upward defense condition and that this effect would be mediated by the acknowledgment of the 
politician’s responsibility-taking intent. Conversely, we expected participants with low political 
sophistication to take the politician’s downward messages at face value and therefore attribute 
higher morality to the politician in the downward defense condition.  
Research overview and hypotheses 
In two studies on two different national groups of participants (British and Italian), we 
analyzed the perception of leadership and morality of a politician being attacked on either 
dimension, and the variation of such perception after the politician used upward or downward 
counterfactuals as a defense.  
We presented participants with a fictitious newspaper article dealing with the negative 
results of a local government official’s decision. The text of the article was manipulated in order to 
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focus on either the politician’s lack of foresight in allocating budget funds (in the leadership-attack 
condition) or the politician’s choice of contracting one of the main campaign funding contributors 
(in the morality-attack condition). Then, after measuring the initial perception of the politician’s 
leadership and morality dimensions, we presented the politician’s response to the allegations, using 
downward counterfactual, upward counterfactual, or non-counterfactual statements. Finally, we 
measured again leadership and morality perceptions, in order to assess the effects of the different 
defensive messages on them. 
A preliminary assumption of the research was that attacks against the politician’s leadership 
or morality would have a stronger negative effect on the respective dimension than on the other one. 
Consistently with the above mentioned asymmetry of leadership and morality in the evaluation of 
politicians, we also assumed that morality would be perceived as lower than leadership.  
Concerning the effects of defensive statements, overall we expected an increase in the 
evaluation of the two dimensions after the politician’s defense. However, we also expected such an 
increase to vary as a function of evaluated dimension and defense type, and we developed four 
specific hypotheses in this regard. First, we expected leadership evaluations to be improved by 
downward counterfactual defenses more than by the other two defense types (Hypothesis 1). This 
would be due to the already mentioned positive effect of downward comparison on the perception 
of one’s past performance. As for morality evaluations, we expected them to be improved by both 
downward and upward counterfactuals (Hypothesis 2). In the former case, this would be again due 
to the effect of downward comparison, as for leadership evaluation. In the latter case, this would be 
instead due to the recognition of a responsibility-taking intent underlying the defense.  
We also expected that the effect of downward versus upward defense on morality 
evaluation, as well as the consideration of the responsibility-taking intent, would vary according to 
participants’ political sophistication. Specifically, we expected low-sophisticated participants to 
attribute higher morality to the politician using a downward counterfactual defense and high-
sophisticated participants to attribute higher morality to the politician using an upward 
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counterfactual defense (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we expected that in the case of high-sophisticated 
participants the positive effect of upward counterfactual defenses on morality evaluations would be 
mediated by the acknowledgment of a responsibility-taking intent to the politician (Hypothesis 4). 
All four hypotheses were tested twice, in Study 1 with a British sample and in Study 2 with 
an Italian sample. We expected to find the same results in both studies, confirming the general 
nature of the observed effects of attacks and defenses in political communication.  
STUDY 1 
In Study 1, we tested our hypotheses by asking a group of participants (university students from a 
British university) to imagine being part of our fictional scenario as the citizens of a local 
community which was going to hold County council elections in the upcoming months.  
Method 
Participants were 109 students from the University of Kent (age M = 19.6, SD = 2.61, 30.3% 
males), who joined this web-based study in exchange for course credit. The study had a 2 (attacked 
dimension: leadership vs. morality) × 3 (defense type: upward counterfactual vs. downward 
counterfactual vs. non-counterfactual) design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six 
experimental conditions. They were presented the text of an alleged newspaper column describing 
the acts of a County Council member regarding the institution of a private school bus service which 
resulted in some extra expenses (£ 40,000) for the County budget. The article focused either on the 
leadership-related shortcomings of the politician (e.g., citing the fact that Mr. XXX miscalculated 
the projected cost of the initiative) or on the morality-related ones (e.g., citing the fact that Mr. 
XXX assigned the service to a private company owned by one of the campaign contributors). The 
text ended with the journalist openly questioning the politician’s fitness for re-election and 
announcing that the politician had promised to respond to those allegations with a declaration. After 
reading the attack text, participants answered a first set of questions. They were asked to rate the 
politician on a series of personality traits (“Based on the impression you made from the information 
included in the article, would you define Mr. XXX as… resolved, tenacious, dynamic, 
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knowledgeable, honest, reliable, sincere, trustworthy”, on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, “not at 
all” to 7, “very”). Two leadership and morality mean indexes were computed, after performing a 
principal factor analysis (using oblimin rotation) which confirmed a bi-factorial solution. The first 
factor explained 38% of variance and was loaded by the morality-related trait items (honest, 
reliable, trustworthy, sincere). The second factor explained 14.24% of variance and was loaded by 
the leadership-related items (resolved, tenacious, dynamic, knowledgeable). 
Once they completed the first part of the questionnaire, participants were presented the 
politician’s response to the previous article. In the response, previous allegations were addressed by 
using either upward counterfactual, downward counterfactual, or non-counterfactual sentences. 
Examples of upward counterfactuals were the following: “If I had more thoughtfully considered the 
financial consequences of such a decision, the resulting expenses would have been avoided.” 
(leadership defense) or “If I had more transparently disclosed the implications of this decision, the 
resulting expenses would have been avoided.” (morality defense). Examples of downward 
counterfactuals were the following: “If I had less thoughtfully considered the financial 
consequences of such a decision, the resulting expenses would have been even larger.” (leadership 
defense) or “If I had concealed the implications of this decision, the resulting expenses would have 
been even larger” (morality defense). Finally, examples of the non-counterfactual defense were: 
e.g., “Although I thoughtfully considered the financial consequences of such a decision, it resulted 
in some extra expenses” (leadership defense) or “Although I transparently disclosed the 
implications of this decision, it resulted in some extra expenses.” (morality defense).  
After reading the response, participants were asked to re-evaluate the politician’s personality 
traits. These measures were intended to replicate those of the first part of the questionnaire, in order 
to allow a comparison between the evaluations given before and after the politician’s defense. 
Participants were also asked to indicate to what extent they believed the politician was taking 
responsibility for the situation (“To what extent do you think Mr. XXX is taking responsibility for 
what happened?”, on a 7-point scale). Then, they were asked some more general questions about 
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their interest in political matters (“How interested are you in politics”, on a scale ranging from 1, 
“not interested at all” to 7, “very interested”), their media use (by indicating how often they read 
political news from newspapers and magazines, TV news and debates or websites, on a 6-point 
scale ranging from “never” to “every day”), and their level of knowledge of political facts, through 
a set of five multiple-choice questions on political institutions (e.g., “There are currently 650 MPs 
in the House of Commons [yes/ no]”) or important political figures (e.g., “What is the current 
position of Nick Clegg, MP, in the incumbent government cabinet? [Deputy prime minister/ 
Secretary of State for Education/Chancellor of the Exchequer]”). Political interest, knowledge and 
media use scores were later recoded into a single political sophistication index (Cronbach’s α = 
.79). Finally, participants were asked to indicate their political orientation (“When speaking about 
political orientation people usually refer to categories such as left, center or right. How would you 
position yourself on the political left-right dimension?”), with five answer options, namely “left”, 
“center-left”, “center”, “center-right” and “right”. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses  
In order to check whether the manipulated attacks to either the leadership or the morality of 
the politician did indeed affect the respective personality dimensions, we analyzed participants’ 
perception of the politician’s leadership and morality after reading the newspaper article containing 
the allegation. We performed a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the attacked dimension 
(leadership vs. morality) as a between-subject factor and the evaluated dimension (leadership vs. 
morality) as a within-subject factor. A main effect of evaluated dimension was found, F(1,103) = 
47.89, p < .001, η2 = .32, with the politician’s morality being evaluated as significantly lower (M = 
2.81, SD = 0.84) than the politician’s leadership (M = 3.42, SD = 1.01). An interaction effect 
between attacked and evaluated dimension was found as well, F(1,103) = 23.13, p < .001, η2 = .18. 
Follow-up ANOVAs on each evaluated dimension showed that the morality evaluation was 
significantly lower in the morality-based attack condition than in the leadership-based attack 
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condition (M = 2.51, SD = 0.98  vs. M = 3.11, SD = 0.96), F(1,108) = 10.22, p < .01, η2 = .09. The 
opposite trend was found for leadership evaluation (M = 3.29, SD = 0.86 in the leadership-based 
attack condition vs. M = 3.54, SD = 0.81 in the morality-based attack condition), although the 
difference only approached significance in this case, F(1,108) = 2.40, p = .13, η2 = .02.  
These results confirmed that the manipulated attacks indeed impaired the attacked 
dimension more than the other one. However, the effect was more evident for the morality attack. 
Morality was generally evaluated as lower than leadership and more heavily affected by negative 
information provided in the attack article. These results were consistent with previous research 
findings, showing that a politician’s morality is evaluated as lower than a politician’s leadership 
(Cislak & Wojcizske, 2008) and that the morality dimension is more sensitive to attacks (Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989;Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993).  
As mentioned in the introduction, some previous research showed a link between political 
orientation and the relative importance attributed to personality dimensions in the evaluation of 
political leaders. We therefore preliminarily checked for differences in the evaluation of the 
politician’s leadership and morality among participants with different political orientations. We ran 
the above-described ANOVAs adding political orientation as a between-subject factor. Results 
showed no main effect of political orientation on the perception of either the politician’s leadership, 
F(4,106) = 0.68, p > .60, η2 = .03, or the politician’s morality, F(4,106) = 1.05, p > .30, η2 = .04, 
nor any interaction effect with the attacked dimension, Fs < 1.2, all n.s. 
Finally, we analyzed the correlations between leadership and morality evaluations. Results 
showed that the evaluations of the politician’s leadership and the politician’s morality were only 
weakly correlated both before and after the politician’s defense (r = .249, p < .01 and r = .279, p < 
.005, respectively). Such low correlation was consistent with what has often been observed by 
previous research on the “Big Two” dimensions (Judd et al., 2005). 
Effect of defense on leadership and morality perception 
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To test our Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the effects of downward and upward defenses on 
the evaluation of the two personality dimensions, we carried out two separate ANOVAs on the 
perception of the politician’s leadership and, respectively, the politician’s morality. In both 
ANOVAs a 2 (attacked dimension: leadership vs. morality) × 3 (defense type: upward 
counterfactual vs. downward counterfactual vs. non-counterfactual) × 2 (measurement time: before 
defense vs. after defense) mixed-design was adopted, with attacked dimension and defense type as 
between-subject factors and measurement time as within-subject factor.  
First of all, the results of the ANOVA on leadership ratings showed a main effect of  
measurement time, F(1, 103) = 26.22, p < .001, η2 = .20, with leadership ratings being significantly 
higher after reading the politician’s defense (M = 3.83, SD = 0.92 ) than before (M = 3.42, SD = 
0.84). More importantly for our research goals, a measurement time by defense type significant 
interaction also emerged, F(2,103) = 3.97, p < .05, η2 = .07. Follow-up separate t-tests for each 
defense type condition were performed. Results showed a statistically significant increase in 
leadership perception in the downward defense condition (from M = 3.39, SD = 0.76 to M = 4.15, 
SD = 0.75), t = 4.98, p < .001. In the other two conditions, differences between leadership 
perception before and after the politician defense were smaller and not significant (all Ms and SDs 
for the various sub-groups are reported in Table 1). Results therefore corroborated Hypothesis 1, 
according to which the downward counterfactual defense would have been more effective than the 
upward one in restoring the evaluation of the politician’s leadership. 
The ANOVA on morality ratings showed a main effect of measurement time, F(1, 103) = 
99.94, p < .001, η2 = .49, with morality ratings being significantly higher after reading the 
politician’s defense (M = 3.75, SD = 1.02) than before (M = 2.81, SD = 1.01). This time, however, 
the measurement time by defense type interaction was not significant, F(2,103) = 0.94, p = .40, η2 = 
.02, with all three defensive strategies leading to a comparable increase in the evaluation of the 
politician’s morality (see Table 1). This result was consistent with our Hypothesis 2, according to 
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which both upward and downward counterfactual defenses would have had a positive effect on 
morality evaluation. 
Moderation analysis 
Although both upward and downward defenses turned out to be effective in restoring the 
politician’s morality, an additional expectation of ours was that this would not be the case for all 
citizens in the same way. According to our Hypothesis 3, political sophistication would moderate 
the effect of upward and downward defenses on morality evaluation. In order to test this hypothesis, 
we created a political sophistication index (centered and standardized) and two dummy variables 
representing the upward and downward counterfactual defense conditions (keeping the factual 
defense condition as a reference point, see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The political 
sophistication index and the two dummy variables were entered in a hierarchical linear regression, 
followed by the respective interaction terms. As a dependent variable, we used an index of the 
increase in morality evaluation after the politician’s response. The index was calculated by 
subtracting the pre-defense morality ratings to the post-defense ones.  
Consistent with the previous ANOVA analysis, no significant main effect of defense type 
emerged. However, significant interaction effects between political sophistication and both the 
upward defense, β = .310, t = 2.79, p < .01 and the downward defense, β = -.335, t = 3.14, p < .005, 
were indeed found (Table 2, right side). Analyses of simple slopes for each defense type showed 
that the upward defense was more effective in increasing perceived morality among more 
sophisticated participants, β = .207, t = 2.32, p < .05, while the downward defense was more 
effective in increasing perceived morality among less sophisticated participants, β = -.248, t = 2.68, 
p < .01 (Figure 1). These results confirm our expectation that political sophistication would 
moderate the effect of counterfactual defense on morality evaluation. Upward and downward 
defensive statements had completely opposite effects on participants with different levels of 
political sophistication, showing the important moderating role of this variable. 
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When performing the same regression on the increase in leadership evaluations, only a 
significant main effect of the downward defense emerged (see the ANOVA analysis above), while 
political sophistication had no effect neither alone nor in interaction with defense type (all 
regression values are shown in Table 2, left side). 
Mediation analysis 
Our final expectation (Hypothesis 4) was that for more sophisticated participants (but not for 
less sophisticated ones) the effect of upward and downward defenses on morality judgments would 
be mediated by the communicative intent attributed to the politician, specifically the one of taking 
responsibility for past performance. To test this expectation, we first split the sample in two 
subgroups with sophistication levels above (n = 54) or below the median value (n = 55). Then, we 
tested the mediational role of responsibility taking on morality judgments in each subgroup. 
Sophisticated participants attributed a stronger responsibility-taking intent to the politician in the 
upward counterfactual defense condition, β = .236, t = 1.75, p = .08. We then regressed the increase 
in morality evaluation on defense type, finding the predicted positive effect of upward 
counterfactual defenses, β = .288, t = 2.17, p < .05. When we included responsibility taking in the 
model, we found that it had a strong positive effect on the increase in perceived morality, β = .547, t 
= 4.68, p < .001, whereas the previous effect of defense type was not significant anymore, β = .159, 
t = 1.38, p  = .17 (Figure 2). Sobel (1982) test of mediation on the indirect effect of defense type 
through responsibility taking approached statistical significance, Z = 1.65, p = .09. 
Less sophisticated participants, on the contrary, did not attribute a stronger responsibility-
taking intent to the politician in the upward counterfactual defense condition, nor in their case did 
such attribution led to a larger increase in perceived morality, Z = 0.50, p > .60.  
These results confirmed our Hypothesis 4 according to which the impression of the 
politician taking responsibility for the negative outcome would mediate the positive effect of the 
upward defense on morality judgments, but only among sophisticated participants. 
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STUDY 2 
To corroborate the findings from Study 1, we replicated the same experimental design and 
procedure on a similar group of participants (university students with comparable age and gender 
distribution), but in a different national context (Italy). We expected to find similar results regarding 
the effects of the politician’s defensive statements, as well as the moderation and mediation effects 
related to participants’ political sophistication.  
Method 
Participants were 121 university students from the Catholic University of Milan (age M = 
22.2, SD = 3.81, 42.4% males), who joined this web-based study as volunteers. The experimental 
design was the same used in Study 1. The manipulation texts were translated into Italian with only 
minor adaptations (e.g., the politician was presented as provincial councilor, which roughly 
corresponds to the County council member position in the Italian local government). The 
questionnaire was also translated and adapted. In particular, the political knowledge questions were 
adapted to Italian political institutions and the Italian trait adjectives used to measure the politician’s 
leadership and morality perceptions were selected basing on the cross-language trait list proposed 
by Abele, Uchronski, Suitner, and Wojciszke (2008).  
Results 
Preliminary analyses  
Like in Study 1, we first of all assessed the effectiveness of the manipulated attacks on the 
corresponding personality dimension. A 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with the attacked dimension 
(leadership vs. morality) as a between-subject factor and the evaluated dimension (leadership vs. 
morality) as a within-subject factor was performed. Results mirrored those found in Study 1. A 
main effect of evaluated dimension emerged, F(1,119) = 175.18, p < .001, η2 = .59, with the 
politician’s morality being evaluated as considerably lower (M = 2.13, SD = 0.97) than the 
politician’s leadership (M = 3.57, SD = 1.13). An interaction effect between attacked and evaluated 
dimension also emerged, F(1,119) = 33.91, p < 001, η2 = .22. Follow-up ANOVAs on each 
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evaluated dimension showed that leadership evaluations were lower in the leadership-based attack 
condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.05) than in the morality-based attack one (M = 3.91, SD = 1.11), 
F(1,124) = 11.71, p < .01, η2 = .09, while morality evaluations were lower in the morality-based 
attack condition (M = 1.82, SD = 0.85) than in the leadership-based attack one (M = 2.43, SD = 
0.99), F(1,124) = 13.22, p < .001, η2 = .10. The effectiveness of each kind of attack on the 
corresponding personality dimension of the politician was therefore confirmed, as it was the lower 
degree of morality attributed to the politician compared to leadership. 
The possible intervening effect of participants’ political orientation on leadership and 
morality perception was also tested, adding political orientation as a between-subject factor to the 
previous ANOVA design. As in Study 1, there was no main effect of political orientation on the 
perception of leadership, F(4,106) = 0.68, p > .60, η2 = .03, and morality, F(4,106) = 1.05, p > .30, 
η2 = .04, nor any interaction effect with the article focus on either dimension, Fs < 1.6, all n.s. 
Effects of defense on leadership and morality perception 
As in Study 1, we compared leadership and morality scores measured before and after the 
politician’s defense, in order to find out whether defensive statements improved the perception of 
the politician and which kind of defense was more effective on each dimension. A 2 (attacked 
dimension) × 3 (defense type) × 2 (measurement time) mixed-design ANOVA was carried out on 
leadership ratings. No main effect of measurement time emerged, while the interaction between 
measurement time and defense type was instead significant, F(2,117) = 3.09, p < .05, η2 = .05. 
Follow-up t tests showed a significant increase in perceived leadership only in the downward 
defense condition, from M = 3.50, SD = 1.21 to M = 3.92, SD = 1.25, t = 2.54, p < .05 (all Ms and 
SDs for the three sub-groups are reported in Table 3). This result, analogous to the one emerged in 
Study 1, offered a further confirmation to our Hypothesis 1 on the higher effectiveness of 
downward counterfactual defenses in improving leadership evaluations.  
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A second ANOVA with the same design was carried out on morality ratings. Results 
mirrored those emerged in the corresponding analysis in Study 1. Morality ratings were 
significantly higher after the participants read the politician’s defense (M = 2.73, SD = 1.03) than 
before (M = 2.14, SD = 0.98), F(1,117) = 49.95, p < .001, η2 = .30, and no significant interaction 
between measurement time and defense type emerged. Apparently, all three defensive strategies 
positively affected the evaluation of the politician’s morality. This result replicated what emerged in 
Study 1 and offered further support to our expectation (Hypothesis 2) regarding the positive effect 
of both upward and downward defenses on morality evaluations. 
Moderation analysis 
In order to assess whether participants’ political sophistication moderated the effect of 
downward and upward defenses on morality evaluations (Hypothesis 3), we followed the same 
procedure employed in Study 1. A political sophistication index (centered and standardized) and 
two dummy variables representing the upward and downward counterfactual defense conditions 
(keeping the factual defense condition as a reference point) were entered in a hierarchical linear 
regression, followed by interaction terms between political sophistication and defense type. Like in 
Study 1, political sophistication significantly interacted (in opposite directions) with both upward 
defense, β = .253, t = 2.21, p < .05, and downward defense, β = -.337, t = 3.06, p < .01. Simple 
slope analyses for each defense type showed that a downward defense led to increased perceived 
morality among less sophisticated participants, β = -.180, t = 2.02, p < .05, while in the case of 
more sophisticated ones this happened for the upward defense, β = .205, t = 2.32, p < .05. The 
moderating role of political sophistication on morality perception (Hypothesis 3), already emerged 
in Study 1, was therefore further confirmed by results of Study 2. Upward and downward defenses 
had opposite effects on the morality evaluations of more versus less sophisticated participants.  
As in Study 1, nothing similar happened as regards the effect of defense on leadership 
ratings. In this case, the same regression model employed for morality ratings showed only a main 
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effect of the downward defense on leadership ratings, β = .202, t = 2.25, p < .05, but no main or 
interaction effects with political sophistication.  
Mediation analysis 
To test the mediation effect of responsibility taking on morality evaluations of sophisticated 
and unsophisticated participants, we followed the same procedure adopted in Study 1. We first split 
the sample in two sub-groups of participants with a sophistication level above (n = 69) or below (n 
= 56) the median value. Sophisticated participants attributed a very strong responsibility-taking 
intent to the politician in the upward counterfactual defense condition, β = .602, t = 6.08, p < .001. 
When the increase in morality evaluation was regressed on defense type, we found the predicted 
positive effect of upward counterfactual defenses, β = .265, t = 2.22, p = .05. After including 
responsibility taking in the model, we also found that it had a strong positive effect on the increase 
in perceived morality, β = .556, t = 4.24, p < .001, whereas the previous effect of defense type was 
not significant anymore, β = .061, t = 0.46, p = .65. Sobel’s (1982) test of mediation on the indirect 
effect of defense type through responsibility taking was clearly significant, Z = 3.34, p < . 001. 
As in Study 1, less sophisticated participants did not instead attribute a responsibility taking 
intent to the politician in the upward counterfactual defense condition, nor such attribution led to a 
larger increase in perceived morality, Z = 0.69, p > .49.  
These results were similar to those found in Study 1, corroborating Hypothesis 4, according 
to which the perception of the politician taking responsibility for the negative outcome would 
mediate the positive effect of the upward defense on morality judgments. Once again, this was true 
only among more sophisticated participants. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results of our research contribute to expand our knowledge of how communication can 
influence social perception, in particular how defensive communication can influence the 
perception of the two fundamental dimensions, agency and communion. We found that different 
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types of defense, based on counterfactual upward or downward comparisons, can differently 
increase the perception of leadership and morality of politicians responding to an attack. We also 
found that these effects differ according to the level of political sophistication of receivers. The 
robustness of these results is confirmed by the fact that they emerged in both our studies, carried out 
with participants from different countries (Britain and Italy). Although our research focused on the 
political context, its findings have a more general relevance, contributing to a deeper understanding 
of the complex relationships between communication and social perception. 
First of all, our data on the effects of attack and defense communication on the perception of 
politicians were consistent with the primacy of morality in social perception already found by 
previous psycho-social research. As discussed in the introduction, people usually pay more attention 
to information about morality than to information about other personality dimensions (Abele & 
Brückmuller, 2011; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Ybarra et al., 2008), particularly in the case of 
negative information (Brambilla et al., 2011; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). In the political context, 
where the evaluation of politicians’ morality is often lower than that of other dimensions (Cislak & 
Wojciszke, 2008) people are also very likely to be sensitive to the morality dimension. This is 
precisely what we found in the research. Attacks to morality had a stronger negative influence on 
the perception of morality than attacks against leadership had on the corresponding dimension. 
Interestingly, defenses focusing on morality also had a more evident effect on participants’ 
perceptions than those focusing on leadership. Evidently, the mere fact of responding to allegations 
about one’s own morality has a positive effect on morality evaluation (see also Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, 
Dirks, 2007). These results extend previous research on the primacy of morality information in 
social perception (Abele & Brückmuller, 2011; Vonk 1999; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Wojciszke & 
Abele, 2008; Ybarra et al., 2008) by showing what happens when such information is part of attack 
or defense communication. 
Besides these general differences in the effects of communication about leadership and 
morality, more specific differences in the effects of various defenses on the perception of the two 
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personality dimensions also emerged. We found downward counterfactual defenses, focusing on 
how things might have been worse than they actually did, to significantly increase the perception of 
the politician’s leadership more than upward counterfactual defenses. As shown in previous studies 
in different areas, such as in the judiciary, downward counterfactuals favor positive evaluations by 
eliciting comparisons with a more negative standard (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 
1993; Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Nario-Redmond & Branscombe, 1996). Consistently, 
politicians using downward counterfactual defenses were successful in shedding a more positive 
light on their past performances and inducing their audiences to evaluate their leadership more 
positively. Upward counterfactuals were not as successful in increasing leadership perception. Even 
if generating upward counterfactual thoughts (focusing on how things might have been better than 
they were) can improve one’s future performance on the same task (Epstude & Roese, 2008), our 
own data suggest that their use in defensive communication actually stresses the shortcomings of 
past actions more than it highlights the possibility of future improvements.  
As for the perception of morality, both downward and upward counterfactual defenses 
turned out to be effective. However, in this case a strong effect of political sophistication also 
emerged. In the case of less sophisticated citizens, downward defenses increased perceived 
morality. In the case of more sophisticated citizens, on the contrary, upward defenses were more 
effective in increasing perceived morality and such increase was mediated by responsibility-taking 
by the defending politician. In other words, whereas the less sophisticated tend to take the message 
at face value, the negativity of politicians’ past performances being reduced by downward 
comparisons, more sophisticated citizens’ assessment of politicians’ morality is based on a more 
complex examination of the defensive message. Despite being less persuading per se, an upward 
counterfactual defense is recognized as indicating that the politician is more willing to take 
responsibility for past actions. Such communicative implicature (Grice, 1975) is taken as a proof of 
the politician’s morality, thus improving its evaluation. Such results are consistent with previous 
studies indicating a tendency of politically sophisticated people to more deeply scrutinize 
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information about politicians, particularly in the case of messages coming from a source perceived 
as suspicious (McGraw et al., 2002). 
In sum, the effects of defensive communication on leadership perception seem to depend 
mainly on the content of what people say to defend themselves, whereas the effects of defensive 
communication on morality seem to be more influenced by the communicative intention attributed 
to the speaker. This is not surprising if we take in mind that judgments about leadership (i.e., 
agency) are based on one’s ability to attain results, whereas judgments about morality (i.e., 
communion) are based on one’s ability to relate with other people (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; 
Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Morality judgments are therefore more likely to be based on the 
relational dimension of defensive messages. 
The effects of defenses were substantially the same in both studies, indicating that the results 
were consistent across different national and political contexts. As such, results from our research 
provide some general insight on how political leaders can work to shape the impression they make 
when defending their past performance. Politicians should be aware that citizens’ judgment on their 
leadership will largely depend on the way in which they present such performance. On the contrary, 
citizens’ judgment on their morality may also be largely influenced by the intention attributed to the 
defensive communication per se. As our data clearly showed, however, not all citizens make such a 
close inspection of intentions underlying defensive communication. Future research should further 
investigate individual differences in citizens’ ability or motivation to detect subtle discursive cues 
that allow to go beyond the explicit content of defensive messages. This would help politicians to 
tailor their defensive message according to the characteristics of their audience, and this would be 
especially relevant when politicians are defending their morality. 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for leadership and morality scores before 
and after the politician’s defense (Study 1). 














3.39 (0.76) 4.15 (0.75)      4.69*** 2.82 (0.98) 3.85 (0.97) 5.29*** 
Non-CF 
defense 
3.37 (0.89) 3.56 (1.04) 1.85 2.68 (1.01) 3.44 (1.07) 6.24*** 
Upward CF 
defense 
3.51 (0.88) 3.78 (0.89) 1.88 2.91 (1.06) 3.95 (0.96) 6.17*** 
*** p < .001 
The “Big Two” in Political Communication      31 
 
 Table 2. Moderation analysis. Regression coefficients for the increase in perceived leadership and 
morality of the politician evaluation and the evaluation of after the politician’s defense (Study 1). 
 Increase in perceived 
leadership 
Increase in perceived 
morality 
 β t Sig. β t Sig. 
Predictor variables:       
Upward CF defense .074 0.78 .440 .092 0.86 .171 
Downward CF defense .259 2.73 .008** .072 0.68 .501 
Political sophistication -.069 0.67 .506 -.028 0.31 .187 
Interactions:       
Upward CF × Political 
sophistication .007 0.08 .940 .310 2.90 .005** 
Downward CF × Political 
sophistication -.014 0.14 .892 -.335 3.14 .002** 
R2  .031    .078   
N 109   109   
** p < .01 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for leadership and morality scores before 
and after the politician’s defense (Study 2). 














3.50 (1.21) 3.92 (1.25) 2.54* 2.15 (0.97) 2.64 (1.02) 3.37** 
Non-CF 
defense 
3.78 (1.00) 3.68 (1.10) 0.57 2.09 (1.01) 2.74 (1.10) 4.00*** 
Upward CF 
defense 
3.47 (1.20) 3.51 (1.04) 0.26 2.18 (0.99) 2.82 (1.00) 4.61*** 
*** p < .001 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Increase in perceived leadership and morality of the politician as a function of defense 
type and participants’ political sophistication (Study 1). 
Figure 2. Mediation of responsibility taking on the increase in perceived morality after the 
politician's defense (politically sophisticated participants, N = 54, Study 1). Note: Defense type was 
coded +1 = upward CF, 0 = non CF, -1 = downward CF. 
† p = .08; * p < .05; *** p < .001 
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